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United States v. Pollution Abatement Services
of Oswego, Inc.: Expansion Of Shareholder
Corporate Officer Liability In A Closely-
Held Corporation
I. Introduction
A principal consideration in the decision to incorporate is
the concept of limited liability.' Corporate shareholders are
traditionally considered to be a distinct entity separate from
the corporation.2 As such, these individuals are insulated from
the liabilities that the corporation may incur and their per-
sonal wealth will not be subjected to the risks inherent in a
business enterprise.' The rationale behind this concept is to
encourage commerce and free enterprise.4 However, when a
corporation is perceived as not complying with corporate for-
malities or that it is perpetrating acts that result in an injus-
tice to innocent parties, courts will disallow the corporate
form and "pierce the corporate veil."5 Once the corporate
form is disallowed, limited liability of corporate shareholders
vanishes and they may be held personally liable. Courts, in
general, are reluctant to disallow the corporate form and start
with the presumption that it is valid.'
Closely-held corporations may be defined as corporations
whose shares are held by a single shareholder or a closely-knit
group of shareholders who control corporate policy and are ac-
tive in the conduct of the business. Usually, shareholders of
closely-held corporations exercise their control by serving on
the board of directors or as corporate officers. As will be seen
1. H. Henn & J. Alexander, Laws of Corporations § 73 (1983).
2. Id. § 68, at 127.
3. Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 Willamette L. Rev. 371, 371 (1981).
4. Id.
5. H. Henn & J. Alexander, supra note 1, § 146.
6. Id.
7. Black's Law Dictionary 308 (5th ed. 1979).
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in this Note, participation in the management of a closely-
held corporation may subject the shareholder corporate officer
to personal liability, without the need to "pierce the corporate
veil" when the corporation is involved in environmental pollu-
tion. This liability is premised on the authority and control
that the corporate officer has to either prevent or correct these
unlawful situations from developing.
Since the 1960's, environmental issues, including corpo-
rate pollution, have raised public and governmental interest.
As a result, environmental protection laws were passed by
Congress." Supplementing these recent laws is the Rivers and
Harbors Appropriations Act of 18999 (Rivers and Harbors
Act) which prohibits the pollution of the navigable waters and
harbors of the United States.' 0 In particular, section 13 of the
Rivers and Harbors Act," which bans the discharge of refuse
into navigable waters or onto its banks, has been instrumental
in litigating cases involving the seepage of chemicals or waste
into navigable waters. 2
8. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. III 1985);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp III 1985); Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Toxic Substances
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Safe Drinking Water
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-10 (1982); Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. III
1985).
9. Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121 (codi-
fied at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-415 (1982)).
10. See Rodgers, Industrial Water Pollution and the Refuse Act: A Second
Chance for Water Quality, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 761 (1971); Tripp & Hall, Federal
Enforcement Under the Refuse Act of 1899, 35 Alb. L. Rev. 60 (1970); Comment,
The Refuse Act of 1899: Its Scope and Role in Control of Water Pollution, 58 Calif.
L. Rev. 1444 (1970); Comment, Discharging New Wine Into Old Wineskins: The
Metamorphosis of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 483 (1972);
Note, The Refuse Act of 1899: New Tasks for an Old Law, 22 Hastings L.J. 782
(1971); Note, The Refuse Act: Its Role Within the Scheme of Federal Water Quality
Legislation, 46 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 304 (1971).
11. Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1121,
1152 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982)).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966); United
States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960); United States v. American Cyan-
amid Co., 480 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Perma Paving Co., 332 F.2d
754 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Ballard Oil Co. of Hartford, 195 F.2d 369 (2d Cir.
1952).
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In United States v. Pollution Abatement Services of Os-
wego, Inc.'3 (Pollution Abatement Services), the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit held for the first time that indi-
vidual corporate officers in closely-held corporations could be
found civilly liable for violations of the Rivers and Harbors
Act based only on their personal involvement in directing the
company and held so without the need to "pierce the corpo-
rate veil." The court stated that the enforcement section of
the Rivers and Harbors Act"' allows a corporate officer to
come under the definition of a "person" and, as a result, can
then be held personally liable for violations under the Act.'5
The court also stated that while this enforcement section ex-
plicitly refers only to criminal sanctions, civil liability could
be imposed for section 13 violations of the Rivers and Harbors
Act.' 6
This Note will discuss the issue of holding corporate of-
ficers liable without "piercing the corporate veil." Part II in-
cludes background discussions on the Rivers and Harbors Act
and the liability of corporate officers in general. Part III sets
forth the factual aspects of Pollution Abatement Services in
which a corporation was charged with polluting a navigable
water in violation of section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act.
This part will also discuss the opinions of both the District
Court and Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Part IV analyzes
the Second Circuit's opinion and how it may affect future de-
terminations of corporate officer liability under section 13 of
the Rivers and Harbors Act and other environmental statutes.
Finally, Part V concludes with an examination of the condi-
tions which courts may consider in holding corporate officers
liable.
13. United States v. Pollution Abatement Servs. of Oswego, Inc., 763 F.2d 133
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 605 (1985).
14. Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 16, 30 Stat. 1121,
1153 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1982)).
15. Pollution Abatement Servs., 763 F.2d at 135.
16. Id.
1986]
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II. Background
A. The Rivers and Harbors Act
The Supreme Court in Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v.
Hatch, stated that "[t]here must be a direct statute of the
United States in order to bring within the scope of its laws...
obstructions and nuisances in navigable streams within the
States.' 117 As a result of the Willamette holding, Congress en-
acted several statutes, 8 the culmination of which established
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. The Act was passed with
the original purpose of "[m]aking appropriations for the con-
struction, repair, and preservation of certain public works on
rivers and harbors and for other purposes."' 9 It gave the gov-
ernment statutory authority to regulate activities that affected
navigable waters and harbors of the entire nation.
Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, the section liti-
gated in Pollution Abatement Services, evolved from the fol-
lowing statutes. Section 3 of the Act of August 5, 1886, pro-
hibited discharges into the navigable waters of New York
harbor only.2" This 1886 Act was superseded by the Act of
June 29, 1888 which again applied only to the navigable wa-
ters of New York harbor but added a penalty provision for a
violation of the section.2 ' The Act of September 19, 189022 was
17. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, 8 (1888). Owners of a wharf
and tow-boat unsuccessfully tried to prevent a company from building a bridge across
a navigable water on the grounds that it would impede and obstruct navigation.
18. The statutes, which the 1899 Act consolidated, were not designed as environ-
mental laws per se but were actually appropriations bills designating funds to be
spent on improvements of navigable rivers and harbors that also contained some gen-
eral legislation. Some members of Congress expressed concern about putting general
legislation into an appropriations bill during the floor debate of the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1894. The concern centered on the fact that most members would
ignore the import of the general legislation in their zeal to get money appropriated
for their particular district. "I would like to know why it is that all this general legis-
lation on these subjects is put in an appropriation bill appropriating money for the
improvement of rivers and harbors?" 26 Cong. Rec. 4,358 (1894) (statement of Rep.
Ray). See also Comment, Discharging New Wine Into Old Wineskins: The Metamor-
phosis of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 483, 497-501 (1972)
(provides detailed legislative history of the Rivers and Harbors Act).
19. Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121.
20. Act of Aug. 5, 1886, ch. 929, § 3, 24 Stat. 310, 329.
21. Act of June 29, 1888, ch. 496, § 3, 25 Stat. 209.
[Vol. 4
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the first Act to prohibit discharges into navigable waters
across the entire country and was the statute passed in re-
sponse to Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch.2" The 1890
Act also prohibited the deposit of material onto the banks of
navigable waters .2  Later, Congress passed the Act of August
18, 1894,11 which still contained the prohibition against dis-
charging or dumping refuse into navigable waters but omitted
the provision prohibiting the deposit of material onto the
banks of navigable waters.2 Penalty provisions, similar to the
1888 Act to protect New York Harbor, were also added.
The Act of March 3, 1899, known as the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899 (Rivers and Harbors Act) was a consoli-
dation of these previous Acts and is still currently in force.2 8
Section 13 of the 1899 Act was a combination of section 6 of
the 1890 Act which prohibited discharges into navigable wa-
ters and section 6 of the 1894 Act which prohibited the depos-
iting of material onto the banks of navigable waters.29 The
penalty provision of the 1894 Act was placed separately in
section 16 of the 1899 Act and provided criminal penalties for
22. Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 907, 26 Stat. 426.
23. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1 (1888).
24. Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 907, § 6, 26 Stat. 426, 453.
25. Act of Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 299, 28 Stat. 338.
26. Id. § 6.
27. Id. § 7-8.
28. Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121 (codi-
fied at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-415 (1982)).
29. Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1121,
1152 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982)). The provision states in part:
It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit, or cause, suffer, or
procure to be thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship,
barge, or other floating craft of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufac-
turing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or
description whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and
passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any navigable water of the United
States, or into any tributary of any navigable water from which the same
shall float or be washed into such navigable water; and it shall not be lawful
to deposit, or cause, suffer, or procure to be deposited material of any kind in
any place on the bank of any navigable water, or on the bank of any tributary
of any navigable water, where the same shall be liable to be washed into such
navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods, or
otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed....
5
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section 13 violations.30
Even though a violation of the Rivers and Harbors Act
should result in criminal penalties, the Supreme Court has
modified the enforcement section to include the use of injunc-
tions"1 and civil penalties.32 This was the remedy (preliminary
injunction and reimbursement of costs) sought by the United
States in Pollution Abatement Services.
B. Liability of Corporate Officers In Closely-Held
Corporations
Limited liability is one of the principal objectives of in-
corporation. 3 Its purpose is to encourage individuals to invest
capital into a corporation, thus promoting free enterprise and
commerce, by not subjecting all of the individual's personal
wealth to the risks associated with the business venture.34 The
concept of limited liability is based on the theory that the cor-
poration is a separate entity, distinct from its shareholders.3 5
30. Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 16, 30 Stat. 1121,
1153 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1982)). This provision enforces section 13 and pro-
vides in part:
Every person and every corporation that shall violate, or that shall
knowingly aid, abet, authorize, or instigate a violation of the provisions of
sections 407, 408, and 409 of this title shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and
on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $2,500 nor
less than $500, or by imprisonment (in the case of a natural person) for not
less than thirty days nor more than one year, or by both such fine and im-
prisonment, in the discretion of the court. ...
31. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960). United States was
granted an injunction to stop companies from depositing industrial solids in a naviga-
ble water. The Court stated, "Congress has legislated and made its purpose clear; it
has provided enough federal law ... from which appropriate remedies may be fash-
ioned even though they rest on inferences. Otherwise we impute to Congress a futility
inconsistent with the great design of this legislation." Id. at 492.
32. Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967). United States
was allowed to recover, from the corporation, the costs of removing a vessel which it
claimed had been negligently sunk. The Court stated that "Itihe inadequacy of the
criminal penalties explicitly provided by § 16 of the Rivers and Harbors Act is be-
yond dispute. That section contains only meager monetary penalties .... [The penal-
ties] would not serve to reimburse the United States for removal expenses." Id. at
202.
33. H. Henn & J. Alexander, supra note 1, § 73.
34. Barber, supra note 3, at 371.
35. H. Henn & J. Alexander, supra note 1, § 68, at 127.
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A de jure corporation, one which observes corporate formali-
ties, possesses adequate initial financing, and is not formed to
evade the law, will enable a controlling shareholder to gener-
ally enjoy limited liability and be insulated from attacks on
the basis of incorporation defects.3 6
A closely-held corporation is defined as a corporation
whose shares are held by a single shareholder or by a closely-
knit group of shareholders, and are not issued or traded pub-
licly.3 7 Since such a corporation concentrates control and
knowledge in a single shareholder or small group of sharehold-
ers, usually serving as corporate officers or on the board of
directors, courts have imposed compliance with two require-
ments: (1) the "business must be conducted on a corporate
and not [on] a personal basis," and (2) the "enterprise must
be established on an adequate financial basis."38 Incorporation
formalities must also be met, such as, "drafting articles of in-
corporation, bylaws, forms of share certificates, shareholder
and other agreements ... and agenda or minutes for any re-
quired organization meetings."3 9 Maintenance of the corporate
form is important so that shareholders or officers can take ad-
vantage of limited liability, which is applicable only as long as
the corporate form is maintained."'
36. Id. § 139.
37. H. Henn & J. Alexander, supra note 1, § 257, at 695. See also Donahue v.
Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 586, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (1975) (defining a
closely-held corporation as having a small number of shareholders, no ready market
for corporate shares, and substantial shareholder participation in the management,
direction and operations of the corporation).
38. H. Henn & J. Alexander, supra note 1, § 147, at 353. See DeWitt Truck
Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976). In DeWitt,
the court listed eight factors for consideration of whether the corporate entity should
be disregarded and shareholders could be held personally liable: (1) insufficient capi-
talization for purposes of corporate undertaking, (2) failure to observe corporate for-
malities, (3) nonpayment of dividends, (4) insolvency of debtor corporation at time of
transaction in question, (5) siphoning of funds by dominant shareholder, (6) nonfunc-
tioning of other. officers and directors, (7) absence of corporate records, and (8) exis-
tence of corporation as mere facade for individual dealings. Id. at 685-87. Accord Vic-
toria Elevator Co. v. Meriden Grain Co., Inc., 283 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 1979); Ramsey
v. Adams, 4 Kan. App. 2d 184, 603 P.2d 1025 (1979); Amoco Chemicals Corp. v. Bach,
222 Kan. 589, 567 P.2d 1337 (1977).
39. H. Henn & J. Alexander, supra note 1, § 166, at 266.
40. See Barber, supra note 3, at 371; Dobbyn, A Practical Approach to Consis-
19861
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A court might ignore the corporate form in situations
which involve inadequate initial financing, where corporate
formalities are disregarded, or where the incorporation is a
fraud that was set up to avoid existing obligations or stat-
utes."1 In closely-held corporations, courts will also consider
the control and knowledge that is concentrated in the princi-
pal shareholder or shareholders who have the ability to pre-
vent, stop, or correct situations which may be unlawful.42 In
these types of situations, even though the incorporation is
technically correct, the court may disregard the corporate
form and metaphorically, "pierce the corporate veil, '' 43 and
"regard the corporation as an association of persons."44 Theo-
retically, negation of the corporate form should apply equally
to both publicly-held corporations and closely-held or family
corporations. However, it appears that the corporate veil is
tency in Veil-Piercing Cases, 19 U. Kan. L. Rev. 185 (1971); Krendl & Krendl, Pierc-
ing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquiry, 55 Den. L.J. 1 (1978); Note, Piercing
the Corporate Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common Law, 95 Harv.
L. Rev. 853 (1982).
41. H. Henn & J. Alexander, supra note 1, § 146, at 347. See Comment, Limited
Limited Liability: A Definitive Judicial Standard for the Inadequate Capitalization
Problem, 47 Temp. L.Q. 321 (1974); Note, Inadequate Capitalization as a Basis for
Shareholder Liability: The California Approach and a Recommendation, 45 So. Ca-
lif. L. Rev. 823 (1972).
42. H. Henn & J. Alexander, supra note 1, § 147, at 353.
43. Id. § 146, at 344.
44. Id. § 146, at 346 (quoting Sanborn, J., in United States v. Milwaukee Refrig-
erator Transit Co., 142 F.2d 247, 255 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905)). There is some disagree-
ment in the use of phrases such as "piercing the corporate veil" and "disregarding the
corporate entity" as unnecessarily clouding a decision. One court has stated it is un-
necessary to use these terms:
Corporate presence and action no more than those of an individual will bar a
remedy demanded by law in application to facts. Hence the process is not
accurately termed one of disregarding corporate entity. It is rather and only a
refusal to permit its presence and action to divert the judicial course of ap-
plying law to ascertained facts. The method neither pierces any veil nor goes
behind any obstruction, save for its refusal to let one fact bar the judgment
which the whole sum of facts requires. For such reasons, we feel that the
method of decision known as "piercing the corporate veil" or "disregarding
the corporate entity" unnecessarily complicates decision. In re Clarke's Will,
204 Minn. 574, 578-79, 284 N.W. 876, 878-79 (1939).
However, these and other terms will most likely continue to be used. See H. Henn &
J. Alexander, supra note 1, § 146, at 344 n.2.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss1/8
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pierced primarily in closely-held corporations."5
III. Pollution Abatement Services: The District and Court
of Appeals Decisions
A. The District Court Decision
On July 19, 1977, the United States Attorney filed an ac-
tion in the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of New York, alleging that, since April 1, 1976, Pollution
Abatement Services of Oswego, Inc. (PAS) was intermittently
discharging refuse matter into Wine Creek, a navigable water-
way, and depositing material onto the banks of Wine Creek,
which could be washed into the water in violation of section
13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act.4 The refuse matter con-
sisted of oil, chemical wastes, polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCB's) and other pollutants. 47 The United States Attorney
filed an amended complaint on August 15, 1977, naming H.
Willard Pierce, President, and Jack Miller, Vice-President, of
PAS as additional party-defendants.48 Pierce and Miller were
not only officers, but also stockholders and directors of PAS.4 9
The government moved for a preliminary injunction on
August 16, 1977.50 After a hearing, the district court issued
the preliminary injunction on August 26, 1977, holding that
the government had demonstrated a "likelihood of success on
the merits" and ordered PAS to stop "irreparable injury to
the Plaintiff, the United States, its citizens, and navigable wa-
ters." 51 The court determined that the site had to be cleaned
45. Barber, supra note 3, at 372.
46. Brief for the United States at 3, United States v. Pollution Abatement Servs.
of Oswego, Inc., 763 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1985) (No. 85-6005) [hereinafter Brief for
United States].
47. Id. at 4.
48. Id.
49. United States v. Pollution Abatement Servs. of Oswego, Inc., No. 77 Civ. 271,
slip op. at 4 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 1977).
50. Brief for United States at 4. Injunctive relief is allowed under the Rivers and
Harbors Act even though it is not specifically stated. United States v. Republic Steel
Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960). See supra note 31.
51. United States v. Pollution Abatement Servs. of Oswego, Inc., No. 77 Civ. 271,
slip op. at 5 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 1977).
1986]
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up to prevent any further damage. During the hearing, the
district court requested the parties to submit proposals for
cleaning up the site.52 The court determined that the United
States had the technical expertise to carry out the cleanup
and ordered the cleanup to be done under the supervision of
the Environmental Protection Agency. 3 The court then is-
sued a judgment stating that the cost of the cleanup was to be
borne by the individual defendants, Pierce and Miller, jointly
and severally, and would be assessed after the cleanup was
finished. 4
The district court characterized section 13 of the Rivers
and Harbors Act as a malum prohibitum statute. It stated
that "It]he doing of the act in and of itself, or the omission or
failure to do a required act, in and of itself creates the viola-
tion.""5 The court based the personal liability of the corporate
officers, Pierce and Miller, on facts which demonstrated that
"[tihe individual defendants, by reason of their respective po-
sitions and activities in the Corporation, and by reason of
their activities, had the responsibility and the authority either
to prevent, in the first instance, or promptly to correct the
violations complained of, and they failed to do so."s Pierce
and Miller "were in a position to control the activities of the
Company in such a manner as to have in the first instance,
not caused the pollutants to flow into the navigable waters,
and in the second instance, to have remedied the situation." s5
The court considered the nature of the corporation (PAS was
a small closely-held corporation) and its size (four stockhold-
ers) to infer that there were "overlapping reponsibilities of the
officers and managers who were running the Company . ..
52. Id. at 13.
53. Id. at 13-14.
54. Pierce and Miller appealed the court's decision pertaining to the preliminary
injunction on October 21, 1977, but subsequently withdrew the appeal after a pre-
briefing conference where it was decided that the appeal could be reinstated after the
actual dollar amount of the cleanup was determined by the United States and the
district court judgment finalized. Brief for the United States at 6-7.
55. United States v. Pollution Abatement Servs. of Oswego, Inc., No. 77 Civ. 271,
slip op. at 6 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 1977).
56. Id. at 5.
57. Id. at 7.
[Vol. 4
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[and they could not] claim to be insulated from the prohibited
conduct."58 Relying on United States v. Park,59 the court rea-
soned that due to Pierce and Miller's involvement in running
the company, they could have prevented the discharges from
flowing into Wine Creek since they, as corporate officers, had
the authority and responsibility to act and could have quickly
remedied the problem. 0
The cost of the cleanup, in the amount of $411,269.10,
was certified by the United States in March 1983.61 In May
1983, the district court entered this amount against Pierce
and Miller.2 The corporation itself was not assessed, having
been dissolved by proclamation for nonpayment of taxes.6
Pierce and Miller appealed the decision on the grounds that
corporate officers could not be held personally liable for a vio-
lation by the corporation of section 13 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899.64
B. The Decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
The issue on appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
58. Id. at 8.
59. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975). The president of a large food
chain was held criminally liable under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act for
allowing interstate food shipments to be exposed to rodent contamination when
stored in a company-owned warehouse. Liability was based on the fact that the presi-
dent "had a responsible relation to the situation" and could have remedied the prob-
lem. Id. at 674.
60. United States v. Pollution Abatement Servs. of Oswego, Inc., No. 77 Civ. 271,
slip op. at 7 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 1977).
61. Brief for United States at 7.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2.
64. Brief for Pollution Abatement Servs. at 4, United States v. Pollution Abate-
ment Servs. of Oswego, Inc., 763 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1985). Pierce and Miller were actu-
ally renewing the appeal they had filed in 1977. See supra note 54. After a pre-argu-
ment conference held under the Civil Appeals Management Program, the case was
remanded to the district court to "determine whether it had the authority to enjoin
the defendants from further discharging, to require the government to clean up the
site, and to authorize the government to certify the costs of the clean-up, and to
consider whether the sum expended for the clean-up costs was reasonable." United
States v. Pollution Abatement Servs. of Oswego, Inc., 763 F.2d 133, 134 n.1. (2d Cir.
1985). The district court answered in the affirmative to all three issues, and entered a
final judgment on October 18, 1984. Pierce and Miller then renewed their appeal.
1986]
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peals was "whether personal liability may be imposed upon
the individual defendants,"6 Pierce and Miller, for a corpo-
rate violation of section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act.
The Second Circuit held that the defendants, as corporate of-
ficers of PAS, could be held civilly liable for violations of sec-
tion 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act. The court relied
mainly on the statutory language of an enforcement section of
the Act, section 16,6 that "[e]very person and every corpora-
tion that shall violate . . ." section 13 may be held liable. 7
The court further reasoned that corporate officers fell within
the category of "every person." Thus, the theory for this lia-
bility was based on the personal involvement of those who
were "directly responsible for statutorily proscribed activ-
ity."" The Second Circuit agreed with the district court that
Pierce and Miller had overlapping responsibilities as officers
and managers in running the company in its day to day opera-
tions and, as a result, were responsible for its illegal dumping
and storage activities.6e
The court acknowledged that section 16 referred explic-
itly to criminal sanctions but relied on the Supreme Court de-
cision in Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States,70
and a case which the Second Circuit had previously decided,
United States v. Perma Paving Co.,71 to support its position
that civil liability could be imposed upon corporations and, in
turn, corporate officers. The court considered civil penalties as
a more appropriate remedy for violations of the Rivers and
65. Pollution Abatement Servs., 763 F.2d at 134.
66. Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, ch.425, § 16, 30 Stat. 1121,
1153 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1982)).
67. Pollution Abatement Servs., 763 F.2d at 135.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967). See supra note
32.
71. United States v. Perma Paving Co., 332 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1964). United
States was allowed to recover costs it incurred in dredging a portion of a navigable
waterway to remove a shoal that resulted from improper use of riparian land. The
court stated, "We see no basis for thinking that the imposition of criminal penalties
and the specific authorization of injunctive relief for a particular purpose indicated a
Congressional desire to withhold a remedy which in many instances will be more ap-
propriate." Id. at 758.
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Harbors Act than the criminal penalties provided therein.72
In their argument, the defendants, Pierce and Miller re-
lied on two Fifth Circuit decisions, United States v. Sexton
Cove Estates, Inc.73 (Sexton Cove), and United States v. Jo-
seph G. Moretti, Inc.74 (Moretti), where corporate officers in
closely-held corporations were found not civilly liable under
section 12 of the Rivers and Harbors Act 75 for the cost of res-
toration work. In both Sexton Cove and Moretti, a developer
had dredged canals that connected to navigable waters with-
out obtaining the necessary permits from the Army Corps of
Engineers and, therefore, violated section 10 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act 76 which requires approval from the Army Corps
of Engineers before any such work can be started. The Fifth
Circuit held that the corporations were to restore the canals
back to the condition they were in before the dredging with
the cost to be borne by the corporations. However, the court
held that the president of each corporation could not be held
personally liable for the costs of the restoration work. The
Fifth Circuit stated, "[a] corporate officer may not be held
civilly liable for a corporate violation of the Rivers and
72. United States v. Pollution Abatement Servs. of Oswego, Inc., 763 F.2d 133,
135 (2d Cir. 1985).
73. United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976).
74. United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 526 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1976).
75. Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 12, 30 Stat. 1121,
1151 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 406 (1982)) provides in part:
Every person and every corporation that shall violate any of the provi-
sions of sections 401, 403, and 404 of this title or any rule or regulation made
by the Secretary of the Army in pursuance of the provisions of section 404 of
this title shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof
shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $2,500 nor less than $500, or by
imprisonment (in the case of a natural person) not exceeding one year, or by
both such punishments, in the discretion of the court.
This enforcement section can be compared with the enforcement section litigated in
Pollution Abatement Services as both contain similar wording. See supra note 30.
76. Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 10, 30 Stat. 1121,
1151 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1982)) provides in part:
[I]t shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter or modify
the course, location, condition, or capacity of, any port, roadstead, haven,
harbor, canal, lake, harbor or refuge, or inclosure within the limits of any
breakwater, or of the channel of any navigable water of the United States,
unless the work has been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and au-
thorized by the Secretary of the Army prior to beginning the same.
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Harbors Act unless either the Act itself authorizes such liabil-
ity, or there are sufficient allegations and proof to permit ne-
gation of the corporate form."'77 The court found that section
12 did not provide that a corporate officer could be held "per-
sonally liable on a subsequent civil judgment obtained against
the corporation. 7 8
The Second Circuit distinguished Sexton Cove by finding
that Sexton Cove involved a corporate violation of the Rivers
and Harbors Act and that "the Fifth Circuit viewed the of-
ficer's liability in that case as derivative rather than per-
sonal. 17 9 In Pollution Abatement Services, the Second Circuit
stressed that the corporate officers' liability "was not pre-
mised solely on their corporate offices or ownership, but was
bottomed on their personal involvement in the firm's activi-
ties."'8 0 Due to Pierce and Miller's personal involvement in
running the company and the fact that the violation fell
within the description of section 13 of the Act, the court saw
''no reason to shield from civil liability those corporate officers
who are personally involved in or directly responsible for stat-
utorily proscribed activity."81 Citing its decision in United
States v. American Cyanamid Corp., 2 the court noted that
remedial environmental statutes were to be given expansive
construction and thus the courts could impose civil liability
instead of criminal liability as called for in the Rivers and
77. Sexton Cove, 526 F.2d at 1300.
78. Id. But citing United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975), the court did note
that had the government proceeded with criminal charges against the corporate of-
ficer, the result might have been different since the statute specifically provided for
criminal sanctions. Sexton Cove, 526 F.2d at 1300 n.19. It is apparent that the Fifth
Circuit used the canon of statutory construction that criminal statutes are to be
strictly construed and, therefore, did not expand the statute to include civil liability.
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 59.03 (4th ed. 1974):
79. United States v. Pollution Abatement Servs. of Oswego, Inc. 763 F.2d 133,
135 (2d Cir. 1985).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. United States v. American Cyanamid Corp., 480 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1973).
Corporation was convicted of violating section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act on
the grounds that there was a likelihood that the discharged refuse would wash into
navigable water. The government did not have to prove that the refuse actually
washed into the water. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966).
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Harbors Act. 3
The Second Circuit also noted its recently decided New
York v. Shore Realty Corp.8 4 (Shore Realty) decision, where,
pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980,85 it had "held a cor-
porate officer individually liable without piercing the corpo-
rate veil."86 In Shore Realty, the corporate officer was held
liable for costs incurred by the State of New York for cleanup
of a hazardous waste site. 7 The corporate officer was liable for
the costs since it was shown that he specifically directed, sanc-
tioned, and actively participated in the violations.
In summary, the Second Circuit based its decision of cor-
porate officer liability in closely-held corporations on several
factors. First, considering the statutory language of section 16,
"every person" could be construed to include not only individ-
uals but also corporate officers. Second, corporate officer lia-
bility was based on the officer's personal involvement in run-
ning the company' including the control and authority the
officer had in running the company's day to day activities.
Third, while the Rivers and Harbors Act called for criminal
sanctions, the Act could be given an expansive reading al-
lowing civil penalties to be imposed. Finally, the Second Cir-
cuit, while holding corporate officers personally liable, stated
their holding was closely analogous to Shore Realty, in which
a corporate officer was held liable while not "piercing the cor-
porate veil."
IV. Analysis
The Pollution Abatement Services decision allowed the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals to clarify standards of con-
duct for corporate officers in closely-held corporations who
83. See supra notes 31-32.
84. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
85. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
86. United States v. Pollution Abatement Servs. of Oswego, Inc., 763 F.2d 133,
135 (2d Cir. 1985).
87. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1052.
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manage a company that can directly or indirectly affect the
health, safety and welfare of the public through violation of
environmental laws. However, in doing so, the court broke
new ground and held corporate officers personally liable with-
out negating the corporate form. This section will analyze the
reasoning the court used and the conduct the court considered
in reaching its conclusion.
The Second Circuit stated that the corporate officer lia-
bility imposed "was not premised solely on their corporate of-
fices or ownership, but was bottomed on their personal in-
volvement in the firm's activities. ' 88 Personal involvement
was determined by who made the decisions and was responsi-
ble for the day to day operations of the company. At PAS, the
corporate officers, Pierce and Miller,
had broad responsibilities because the company was so
small; that Miller had been involved in the company's op-
erations and engineering activities since its establishment;
that Pierce had become actively involved in PAS opera-
tions in 1976; that both state and federal government em-
ployees dealt directly with Pierce and Miller and not sub-
ordinates on the problems at the PAS site. 9
Because of their active and intimate knowledge of the opera-
tions of the company, the corporate officers should have
known about the violations taking place at the company and,
due to their authority, could have taken corrective actions as
quickly as possible to prevent any environmental damage.
Therefore, the Second Circuit established that corporate of-
ficers can be held personally liable without negating the cor-
porate form and without explicit statutory authorization from
the Rivers and Harbors Act.
As discussed previously, the Fifth Circuit is the only
other circuit court to have been presented with the issue of
corporate officer liability under the Rivers and Harbors Act.90
88. Pollution Abatement Servs., 763 F.2d at 135.
89. Brief for the United States at 19, United States v. Pollution Abatement
Servs. of Oswego, Inc., 763 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1985).
90. United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976);
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That court held that corporate officers could not be held
civilly liable but only criminally liable for violations of the
Act.91 This was due to the language of the Rivers and Harbors
Act enforcement section which authorizes only criminal liabil-
ity of corporate officers.92 However, what is important to ex-
tract from this case is how the Fifth Circuit defined "every
person" and at what level of personal involvement did the
court require in holding a corporate officer personally liable
when he had been charged criminally. The Fifth Circuit im-
plied two conclusions: that a corporate officer did come under
the definition of "every person," and that there could be
enough personal involvement by the corporate officer to war-
rant holding him personally liable.
The corporate officer involvement that the Fifth Circuit
relied on was set forth in the Sexton Cove district court opin-
ion.9 The district court, in its findings of fact, found that the
corporate officer had been president and resident agent of
Sexton Cove Estates, had authority to bind the company to
contracts and that all government correspondence was ad-
dressed to him. He had also signed the contract which author-
ized the work in question on the Sexton Cove Estates." The
district court went on to state that, "[t]he defendants ... con-
ducted these operations for their personal gain, failing to obey
the law applicable and ignoring the warnings sent out by the
Corps of Engineers." 96 The district court held the corporation
and corporate officer liable for the restoration work and its
cost, noting that the public was entitled to a broad construc-
tion of the Rivers and Harbors Act as interpreted by the Su-
preme Court in Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United
States."
United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 526 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1976). See supra
text accompanying notes 73-79.
91. Sexton Cove, 526 F.2d at 1300.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1300 n.19.
94. United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 602 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
95. Id. at 605.
96. Id. at 606.
97. Id. at 610, 613. See supra note 32.
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Although the Fifth Circuit held the corporation civilly lia-
ble under the Rivers and Harbors Act (following Wyandotte),
the court refused to hold the corporate officer civilly liable,
and reversed the district court decision stating that the stat-
ute authorized criminal liability only.98 Had the Fifth Circuit
decided to hold the corporate officer liable, it would have de-
stroyed the limited liability enjoyed by corporate officers and
in effect would have "pierced the corporate veil."9 9 The Fifth
Circuit chose not to do so by stating that there would have to
be "allegations in the complaint . . . [and] proof at trial to
warrant 'piercing the corporate veil' "100 in order to hold the
corporate officers civilly liable.
In Pollution Abatement Services, the Second Circuit held
corporate officers civilly liable while claiming that the liability
was not based on "piercing the corporate veil," but was in-
stead, "bottomed on their personal involvement in the firm's
activities." 10 1 This is an apparently conflicting result consider-
ing that traditional corporate law requires that the corporate
form be negated in order to hold corporate officers personally
liable.10 2 The reasoning is that if a corporate officer is held
liable, he has lost his limited liability, and with this loss of
limited liability, the corporate veil has been pierced and the
corporate form negated.
The Second Circuit stated its test for "piercing the corpo-
rate veil" in New York v. Shore Realty Corp.103 The court
would negate the corporate form only if "the opposing party
shows that the corporate form is being used fraudulently or as
a means of carrying on business for personal rather than cor-
porate ends." 10' When determining whether or not to "pierce
the corporate veil", the term "fraud" has been interpreted to
98. United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293, 1300 (5th Cir.
1976).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 33-43.
100. Sexton Cove, 526 F.2d at 1301.
101. United States v. Pollution Abatement Servs. of Oswego, Inc., 763 F.2d 133,
135 (2d Cir. 1985).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 33-43.
103. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
104. Id. at 1052.
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include not only fraud or intent to defraud, or bad faith, but
"a showing that injustice may result if the veil is not
pierced."'10 Under this interpretation, the fraudulent prong of
the Second Circuit's two-prong test would be satisfied since it
was clear that an injustice would develop if the corporate of-
ficers were not held liable. If the corporate officers in PAS
were not held liable, the United States could recover its
cleanup costs only from the corporation. However, the corpo-
ration had been dissolved for nonpayment of taxes. 06 This
left no wrongdoer from which to recover and an injustice
would result unless the corporate officers were held liable. If
they were held personally liable, their limited liability was de-
stroyed and the corporate form negated. Thus, the Second
Circuit did "pierce the corporate veil" when it held the corpo-
rate officers liable even though the court stated it had not
done so."0 7
The Second Circuit also relied on its holding in Shore Re-
alty where it stated, "it is beyond dispute that... [the corpo-
rate officer] specifically directs, sanctions, and actively partici-
pates in Shore's maintenance of the nuisance." '° But it is
important to note that Shore Realty involved a Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 109 (CERCLA) violation, not a Rivers and Harbors
Act violation. CERCLA specifically authorizes that corporate
officers can be held civilly liable while the Rivers and Harbors
105. Barber, supra note 3, at 377. See Maley v. Carroll, 381 F.2d 147 (5th Cir.
1967); Contractors Heating & Supply v. Scherb, 163 Colo. 584, 432 P.2d 237 (1967);
Action Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jared Builders, Inc., 368 Mich. 626, 118 N.W.2d
956 (1962); Associated Meat Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 210 Cal. App. 2d 825,
26 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1962).
106. United States v. Pollution Abatement Servs. of Oswego, Inc., 763 F.2d 133,
134 n.2 (2d Cir. 1985).
107. The court had compared the Rivers and Harbors Act with CERCLA, con-
sidering it as an analogous statute, and stated that since it had held "a corporate
officer individually liable without piercing the corporate veil" under CERCLA in a
previous case, it could do so here by "eschew[ing] a 'cramped reading' of the Rivers
and Harbors Act, [and] focusing on its broad remedial purposes." Id. at 135.
108. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1052.
109. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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Act does not.'10 In addition, the corporate officer was given
adequate notice from the language of CERCLA that he may
specifically be held liable for his actions."' Therefore, in
Shore Realty, the Second Circuit was correct in holding the
corporate officer liable without "piercing the corporate veil"
under CERCLA. There was adequate notice and Congress
specifically stated who will be held liable." 2
110. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The provision states in part:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only
to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel (otherwise subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States) or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were dis-
posed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for dispo-
sal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person,
by any other party or entity, at any facility owned or operated by another
party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities or sites selected by such person,
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incur-
rence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan; and
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,
including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss
resulting from such a release.
111. Id.
112. Two district courts, likewise, have held corporate officers liable under CER-
CLA. In United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co. (NEPACCO),
579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), a Missouri district court found that the corporate
officer "had direct knowledge and supervision" for the disposal of hazardous waste.
Id. at 847. The court, in reaching its decision for corporate officer liability under
CERCLA considered the following factors: that, as a major stockholder in the com-
pany and actively participating in the management of the company as vice-president,
the corporate officer had the capacity to control the disposal of the hazardous waste,
the power to direct the negotiations concerning disposal of hazardous waste, and the
capacity to prevent and abate the damage caused by disposal of hazardous waste. Id.
at 849. One year later, this same court decided United States v. Conservation Chem.
Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985). The court again stated that those who take
personal responsibility for the operation of hazardous waste disposal may be held
liable. However, the court did not make a judgment on the case since there was an
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The Second Circuit could have stayed within the bounda-
ries of traditional corporate law by using inadequate capitali-
zation as an additional factor, along with personal involve-
ment, to hold corporate officers liable for the costs of the
cleanup. One major problem with PAS was its finances. From
the findings of fact by the district court, PAS had inadequate
capitalization from the start. The judge stated:
From listening to the evidence, it is clear to me that from
the very start of this Company, it was plagued by a lack
of resources, both technical and financial. This deficiency
throughout the history of the Company, I think, was the
primary cause of the problem that we are meeting
today."'
From this finding, it is clear that PAS did not meet one of the
requirements of a corporation, that of adequate initial capital-
ization."14 As stated previously, PAS "was dissolved by procla-
mation for nonpayment of taxes.""11 5 This opened up the pos-
sibility of ignoring the corporate form and allowing corporate
officer liability.'18 Therefore, the corporate officers could be
held personally liable due to the inadequate capitalization of
PAS.11 7 The United States would still be able to recover its
costs for cleaning up the PAS site and avoid the injustice "of
incomplete factual record available under a summary judgment motion. In United
States v. Carolawn Co., 14 E.L.R. 20699 (D.S.C. 1984), the South Carolina district
court imposed personal liability under CERCLA on corporate officers who managed
the operations of a hazardous waste disposal facility. The court stated, "CERCLA
contemplates personal liability of corporate officials . .. who are responsible for the
day-to-day operations .. " Id. at 20700. This reasoning was based on the fact that
the individual had control and authority over the facilities at which the hazardous
substances were released.
113. United States v. Pollution Abatement Servs. of Oswego, Inc., No. 77 Civ.
271, slip op. at 9 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 1977).
114. Adequate capitalization has been defined as "a function of the size, nature
and reasonably expected hazards and risks of the particular business entity being
examined." Note, Inadequate Capitalization as a Basis for Shareholder Liability:
The California Approach and a Recommendation, 45 So. Calif. L. Rev. 823, 840
(1972).
115. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 38, 42.
117. See also Comment, supra note 41, at 321.
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a wrongdoer shifting responsibility for the consequences of his
negligence onto his victim."11
Premising its holding on inadequate capitalization would
have enabled the Second Circuit to hold corporate officers
personally liable and still remain within the confines of tradi-
tional corporate law without breaking new ground as it did by
finding corporate officers liable without "piercing the corpo-
rate veil." Holding corporate officers personally liable when
not authorized by statute and based only on their personal
involvement appears to put closely-held corporations at a dis-
advantage. By their very nature, closely-held corporations
have corporate officers who are involved directly in managing
the day to day operations of the firm. Therefore, limited lia-
bility for these individuals will be practically non-existent
based on the Second Circuit's holding. This is not to suggest
that wrongdoers need not be punished but rather that more
traditional areas of corporate law should be explored before
breaking new ground.
This holding may also allow corporate officers of large
corporations to avoid personal liability by insulating them-
selves with layers of bureaucracy and putting the blame on
lower levels of management when violations occur. The dis-
trict court in Pollution Abatement Services alluded to this
possibility and cited United States v. Park, ' to indicate that
corporate officers in corporations of all sizes should be held
accountable and liable equally under the law.
V. Conclusion
In view of the Second Circuit's decision, it may be helpful
to summarize guidelines that may be used in holding corpo-
rate officers liable, particularly those associated with small,
closely-held corporations. To begin with, the courts will look
at the characteristics of the company. These include the na-
ture of the company's business, its size, the corporate manage-
ment structure, relationships between management and board
118. Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 204 (1967).
119. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975). See supra note 59.
[Vol. 4
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss1/8
U.S. v. POLLUTION ABATEMENT
of directors, control of subordinates, and the overlapping re-
sponsibilities of officers in both managing and directing the
company. The corporate officer will be presumed to have a po-
sition of authority and control within the corporate structure.
With this authority and control will come a duty to act in a
responsible manner. Should an unlawful situation develop, the
corporate officer must ensure that a workable system or
method be in place whereby the corporate officer is informed
and can take steps to prevent, abate, stop or correct the situa-
tion. It is also important that subordinates are informed of
proper working procedures in order to prevent unlawful situa-
tions from developing.12 0 In summation, authority, knowledge,
direction and control by the corporate officer in the corpora-
tion will be considered in determining liability under environ-
mental laws.
Amelia M. Wagner
120. The government has attempted to ensure that employees are informed of
hazardous chemicals by promulgating a Hazard Communication Standard. See 29
C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1986).
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